

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LESSONS LEARNED FROM MG GEORGE CROOK'S APACHE CAMPAIGNS WITH APPLICABILITY
FOR THE CURRENT GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The current Islamist war on "the West" is global in reach and scope. The United States' involuntarily involvement in this war can be directly traced to the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Iran. Since that time the war grew in scope and intensity and became apparent throughout the United States as result of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The US response to the attacks was to initiate the Global War on Terror and subsequent operations.

While the current conflict is commonly known as the Global War on Terrorism the war is more accurately against the political philosophy of Islamism. Islamism is defined as a fascist inspired political philosophy that has adopted the use of classical Muslim texts and cultural symbols to assist in its propagation.

This is not the first time that the United States has fought a conflict against those who use non-traditional forms of warfare. The country successfully fought similar wars with the Indian tribes of North America. This paper examines the Apache Campaigns and illustrates lessons from Major General George Crook's successful conduct of them that can be valuable in the current US fight against Islamism.

This paper will focus on the three elements of the current war that are similar to the Apache Campaigns: combat operations, non-combatant operations and information operations. George Crook successfully employed these elements to decisively defeat the Apache bands and his lessons may be applied by the US today.

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PREFACE

While the current conflict is commonly known as the Global War on Terrorism the author will use the term “Islamist” (and its derivations) to identify the opponents of the United States. For this paper Islamism is defined as a fascist inspired political philosophy that has adopted the use of classical Muslim texts and cultural symbols to assist in its propagation. Terrorism is the Islamist primary military tactic, but their military operations are not confined to terrorism.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM MG GEORGE CROOK'S APACHE CAMPAIGNS WITH APPLICABILITY FOR THE CURRENT GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

A fight against a dispersed enemy, the use of surrogate ground forces, war made on civilians, an enemy seeking the United States departure from the area, a divided world opinion and a wide ranging area of operations in several countries. Is this describing operations during the turn of this century or the last? Actually it describes both. On September 11, 2001 the Islamist threat was brought to the United States shores with an audacious and spectacular series of attacks. The destruction that visited the eastern seaboard shook the nation and soon a vast majority of the citizenry realized that they were at war with a determined enemy. The realization quickly grew that this enemy did not operate by the commonly accepted rules and the conflict would be protracted and not fought within the usual framework of "war". This was not the first time that the United States has fought such a conflict. The country successfully fought the Indian tribes of North America for a long period. This fight also was sporadic, wide ranging, and not fought within the usual framework of "war". While the battlefields are largely forgotten, people should not forget the intensity of the combat. One example is that in Arizona 196 Medals Of Honor were earned for bravery during the Apache wars.¹ This paper examines the Apache Campaigns of the Indian Wars and illustrates lessons from the Apache Campaigns that can be valuable in today's fight against Islamism.

Major General George Crook's conduct of the 1871-1886 campaigns against the Apaches can provide valuable lessons to assist in the current conflict against Islamism. Both the Apaches and Islamists possess a charismatic group of leaders. The Apaches were led by Cochise, Natchez, Victorio, Geronimo and others, names that still echo throughout the world. Today the leaders include Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and dozens of others unknown to most American citizens but important in their regions stretching throughout the Middle East, Asia, Europe and pockets of the United States. All these historical and current leaders preach a fantasy ideology that seek to have the US depart from "their" territories and for "the people" to return to an imagined life that is forever gone.

Both the historical and current enemies have cadres of fighters who believe death in battle is to be sought out and embraced. These fighters make no distinctions between military forces and unprotected populations except to seek out vulnerable populations and to avoid pitched battles. Both enemies seek to fight a technologically simpler fight, and to do so in a manner that seeks to minimize the strengths of US forces. In the operational and strategic scales both enemies enjoy a widespread, but often shallow, support from their wider populations. They

have an embittered nucleus and a large population who will give support until shown the benefits of not providing support. At the same time both enemies are highly vulnerable to native populations fighting for the US. General Crook and his superiors understood the nature of the fighting required. Unfortunately that does not appear to be the case today.

THE APACHE CAMPAIGNS IN BRIEF

The Apaches, members of the Athapascan linguistic group, arrived in the American Southwest between 900-1200 c.e. and displaced or competed with earlier Indian groups.² As they occupied their terrain they subdivided into several groups now known as the Jicarilla Apache (northern NM); Mescalero and Ojo Caliente Apaches (southern NM); White Mountain Apache (North Central AZ/NM border); Chiricahua Apache (Southern AZ/NM border); Tonto Apache (central AZ) and the Cibecue Group (San Carlos, Arivaipa, Pinal Coyotero bands) in southern Arizona.³ To single out any of these groups as the worst is foolhardy, however the Ojo Caliente and Chiricahua continued the fight under the most noted leaders and until the final bitter end in 1886.

The scattered Apache bands fought numerous unremembered battles with the Tahono O'odham, Pima, Yavapai and various other tribes that co-inhabited the same vast region of the Southwest. Coronado and the early Spanish explorers recorded no Apache conflicts, but by the mid- 1600s the conflict started as Spanish colonization efforts spread up the Rio Grande, Santa Cruz, Gila and San Pedro river systems. For hundreds of years, and battles both large and small, the Spanish and Mexican people fought the Apaches as they raided and sought to maintain their dominance within the region.

The initial American and Apache contacts were peaceful because Cochise, the influential peace and war chief of the Chiricahuas, saw three things. The new arrivals were enemies of their enemies, they were small in number and were interested primarily in gold which was of no value to Apache people. However, conflict with the Americans was inevitable. It started as the odd raid on an isolated ranch and exploded after Cochise was embroiled in the February 4, 1861 Bascom Affair.⁴ In 1861 the US Army left the Territory for service in the eastern Civil War and the Apaches went on the offensive. By 1865 they had succeeded in regaining control of the entire region except for the outposts of Tubac, Tucson, Prescott and El Paso. After the Civil War the army reentered the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico to reestablish United States control over a region that the nation had abandoned to the Apache bands. The Army skirmished with the Apache without decisive result from 1866-1870 killing a claimed 649 (certainly too high a figure) and suffering 84 casualties.⁵ Lieutenant General Sherman sought a

decisive result and so he transferred Lieutenant Colonel George Crook to Arizona. It was the arrival of George Crook in September 1871 that energized the war in scope and intensity.

LTC Crook changed the conflict from brief campaigning to protracted warfare and employed the first Apaches to scout and fight their ethnic relatives. The campaign started in earnest from Fort Verde in late 1871 and spread throughout Arizona in a series of small sharp battles with the various bands. In the campaign's two climatic battles Crook's forces broke the Apache bands. The battles of Turret Peak (actually fought on Skeleton Mesa) and Skull Cave destroyed the central Arizona bands as combatants and from that time forward they would only fight as members of the US Army.⁶ Operations with combined Apache scout and infantry/cavalry teams continued and as a result of a series of now nearly forgotten fights brought the surrender and uneasy peace with the other Apache bands. The Apaches moved onto various reservations and into the hands of the victors. For his success President Grant promoted Crook directly from Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General.

The following few years were difficult times for the Apache bands. Management of the reservations switched numerous times from US government to government overseen non-governmental organization (NGO) and contractor to military. The military supervised reservation periods were regarded by the Apaches as the most stable and least corrupt. There are various reasons for the Army's success, but three common themes and one unambiguous reason emerge. The first was that the military displayed empathy for their charges and willingness to see them as a people with legitimate grievances. The second was the military belief that the government should meet its pledges. The third reason was that the Apache warriors saw the soldiers as a match with them in military prowess and "manliness". The key undisputed reason was that the Apaches trusted the word of Crook and several of his key subordinates. In 1875 Crook was transferred to the northern Plains Indian campaigns and the civil government took over control of the reservations and almost immediately broke the surrender treaties that Crook negotiated. The US government closed all the Arizona and New Mexico Apache reservations (less the White Mountain reservation) and forced all the bands onto the marginally inhabitable San Carlos reservation. By 1877 numerous bands broke out and the war reemerged in Arizona, New Mexico, extreme western Texas and Mexico. The army again employed the mixed scout/infantry/cavalry teams that Crook had pioneered. The war was fought with the army fighting on both sides of the United States and Mexico international border. By 1880 most of the raiders had returned to the reservation, which was temporarily under military control. In 1881 the military surrendered control and by later that same year the breakouts re-occurred. Throughout the region the situation rapidly worsened and with the fight

going poorly it was apparent that the Departmental Commander was not up to the task and in 1882 Crook was recalled to the Arizona Territory.

Crook reestablished military control of San Carlos and quickly started operations against the remaining breakout groups - largely Chiricahua and Ojo Caliente. By late 1883 he broke the spirit of most renegade bands by demonstrating he could mobilize non renegade Apaches against them and by taking the fight into their most impregnable refuges on both sides of the border. The final 1885 breakout by Geronimo was the last gasp for freedom by people who knew the war was over- and that they had lost. Crook employed the same proven campaign plan and on March 25, 1886 Geronimo agreed to a final surrender and the renegades returned to San Carlos.⁷ However while Geronimo and his last few warriors were returning to the reservation a chance meeting with a trader and whiskey robbed Crook of the honor of winning the last battle. After a drinking bout Geronimo and the small group bolted south into Mexico. Sheridan replaced Crook with BG Nelson Miles who employed Crook's methods and received Geronimo's final, final surrender September 4, 1886. When Geronimo and his band boarded the train near Fort Bowie for Florida the war ended forever.

THE ISLAMIST WAR IN BRIEF

The current Islamist war on "the west" is global in reach and scope. The United States' involuntarily involvement in this war can be directly traced to the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Iran. The war soon spread with the 1981 Hizbollah attacks on US interests. There followed a series of attacks on American interests or citizens both home and abroad: at least eight murders in the United States, the Achille Lauro affair, the Beirut Marine Barracks bombing, the kidnapping of COL Higgins (USMC), the hijacking of TWA flight 880, the 1996 Khobar Towers Barracks bombing, and the 1999 suicide crash of an Egypt Air flight among others.⁸ Following the first Gulf War the Al Qaeda linked attacks started in 1993 with the first World Trade Center bombing. This attack was followed a number of failures and a series of successful attacks, notably the Al Qaeda supported resistance in Somalia, the African embassy bombings, the attack on the USS Cole and the attacks of September 11, 2001. The US response to the New York City/Washington/Pennsylvania attacks was to initiate the Global War on Terror and subsequent operations.

The first large counter offensive of the war was against the Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and the Taliban government which provided them with support. In a relatively short and intensive campaign the US destroyed the Taliban government, disrupted the Al Qaeda, and occupied Afghanistan. Subsequent operations against Al Qaeda further disrupted their ability to

conduct operations and caused them to disperse from their bases of operation. In order to deny the Islamists a base of operations the United States and United Nations are conducting nation building within Afghanistan to build a popularly supported Muslim government.

Afghanistan is not the only area of operation for the conflict. The United States military has experienced combat with Special Operations Forces (SOF) or conventional forces in Yemen, the Philippines, Kuwait and Pakistan. The United States is also using diplomatic and economic power to influence law enforcement, banking and military support worldwide. The country is also reviewing how it might use public diplomacy and information to influence the conflict. The conflict with Al Qaeda, however, is by no means over. Recently they and their Islamist allies have become active with attacks on a French oil tanker, resorts in Bali and Kenya and tapes and letters by Osama bin Laden that threaten attacks elsewhere.

The roots of the current conflict predate the current Middle East imbroglio and can be seen in the birth of the various Islamist organizations in the 18th and 19th centuries. Wahabism (aka. Salafis) was the first to rise in the late eighteenth century.⁹ Mohammed ibn al-Wahab (1703-1792 c.e.) was a Muslim judge in the Arabian Peninsula. The basis of this radical fundamentalist movement is that "Islam is both religion and government" and two related theses.¹⁰ These are: 1) "You must necessarily tread the path of those who lived before." 2) Wahabism claims to be the sole proper interpretation of the Koran and that any disagreement from Wahabi interpretation is heresy and subjects the disbeliever to either death or forced conversion.¹¹ By the time of the WWI Arab revolt the Wahabi Brotherhood was a power broker on the Arabian Peninsula. In 1924, when Ibn Saud made his move for control of the peninsula, he allied with the brotherhood in order to seize power. Even early in the 20th century the Wahabi Brotherhood preferred the bold psychological attack to assist them. An example of this is the 1924 attack on the town of Taif where they killed 500 inhabitants in order to weaken other towns resolve to fight Ibn Saud.¹² By December 1925 Ibn Saud was the undisputed ruler of the Arabian Peninsula. By seeking an alliance with the Wahabi Brotherhood Ibn Saud had grasped a rattlesnake by the tail. In 1929 and 1934 the Wahabis revolted against Ibn Saud for being impious and to secure his throne and peace he adopted their stance of puritanical fundamentalism. To this day Saudi Arabia maintains the Wahabi code and the Wahabis are the primary power in Saudi Arabian internal politics.

Islamism has other modern roots as well. In 1928 Hassan al-Banna formed the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt.¹³ Hassan borrowed from the Italian Fascists (at that point still considered modern and powerful) the concept of fanatical following of a charismatic leader and he borrowed from the German National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP or Nazi) the idea

of marrying of the political and spiritual in order to gain and control power. The modern political term “Islamic” also was coined at this time by another leader in the nascent Islamist movement, Maulana Mawdudi, who formed the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami movement in the 1940s.¹⁴ The various brands of earlier Islamism were braided together in the aftermath of WWII by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Sayyid Qutb. His most important speeches and writing called for a monolithic state lead by an Islamic party that would be classless and that all the world would follow the Islamist way. A key point to his writing was the advocacy of violence to achieve its ends and the call for the overthrow of Muslim (vis a vis Islamic) governments who did not practice the same doctrine.¹⁵

The final modern roots developed in Iran and Afghanistan. The power of the Islamist message can be seen by the fact it bridged the previously unbridgeable gap between Shiite and Sunni. The Islamist lead Iranian revolt brought the Ayatollah Khomeini to power and saw the establishment of the first “Islamic State”. Later nearly twenty years of chaos in Afghanistan was stilled with the Islamist Taliban movement consolidating power and imposing their vision of Shariah.

Islamism would not be the threat it is today without the social upheavals of the late twentieth century. The rapid, and in many ways locally undesired, thrusting of nomadic and archaic cultures into modern life brought widespread change throughout the Muslim world. The western world has come into the land of Mohammed and in the course of a single lifetime the city overcame the village as the center of life. In the last twenty years the populations of the Muslim world have doubled. Economic growth has not kept up with population growth and vast slums have spread throughout the region. The ballooning population has not seen the benefit of the new technology that is adopted everywhere and sees the new world as a threat. In the midst of this societal chaos there are many powerful symbols of the archaic Muslim faith. These social conditions are ripe for many to adopt a new creed which promises a better life. A creed that uses the symbols of the “great” old period in an attempt to bring about a new doctrine, and that new doctrine is Islamism. Islamism’s goal remains consistent. It is to bring about a world that uses modern tools in an attempt to follow a narrow puritanical world view dressed in the garb of archaic Muslim belief. According to Fukuyama and Samin the key Islamist beliefs of “the aestheticization of death, glorification of armed force, the worship of martyrdom and faith in the propaganda of the deed” bear little resemblance to the Muslim faith and a great deal of resemblance to 20th century totalitarian belief.¹⁶

The goals of the Islamist ideology have not changed after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom. The prophets of the vision remain true to the stated Islamist goals. In late November

2002 Osama bin Laden released, through the Internet, his latest "letter to America" which was made public in English on 24 November 2002.¹⁷ In the 4000 word release bin Laden attempts to link Muslim struggles in Chechnya, Somalia, the West Bank and Kashmir to the Islamist struggle. He claims the Muslim (vs. Islamist) governments "act as your agents, attack us on a daily basis...prevent our people from establishing the Islamic Shariah."¹⁸ Bin Laden also states the Islamist goal clearly. "The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam."¹⁹ In the text he makes clear that only the Islamist version of the faith of Muhammad is permissible, "You are the nation who, rather than ruling by the Shariah of Allah...choose to invent your own laws as you will and desire."²⁰ The letter then continues with many demands, including but not constrained to, withdraw militarily and economically to within the United States borders, abandon support for Muslim governments and Israel, and to adopt the Kyoto Protocols.

FIGHTING A FANTASY IDEOLOGY

Islamism currently does not pose the same military and social threat to the overthrow of the western world as fascism did in the 1930s. However it does pose a threat to western lives and interests and therefore needs to be confronted and decisively defeated. There are two common schools of thought regarding the roots of the current conflict. One common school of thought blames the war on the west because of the lack of social improvement in the Muslim world. But Osama Bin Laden and other key leaders are multi-millionaires and large numbers of Islamist adherents are drawn from the technically trained and middle-class. Another common school compares the war to WWII and postulates that it does not matter what the policy reasons might be- the United States was attacked and must defeat the enemy. What both schools suppose is that Western policy- as seen by American policy- was attacked and that the Islamists primary goal is to seek a change of political policy. The Islamists do not seek a policy change, they seek- to paraphrase a popular bumper sticker from the 1980s- "US OUT OF THE WORLD" and that desire is clearly a fantasy.

Islamists are similar to the Apache by their attachment to a "fantasy ideology". Lee Harris defines a fantasy ideology as an ideology that seizes the lack of realism in a political group and makes the most of it. They do this through the manipulation of the use of old and powerful symbols and rituals, all of which are designed to permit the members of the group to indulge in fantasy role-playing.²¹ The best known 20th century example is Hitler's fantasy of a Third Reich, based on German racial purity and the requirement for additional living space.

The strength of Germany makes it a poor example for use in the current war for two reasons. The first is that Germany displayed the industrial base, social cohesion, and the

strategic, operational and tactical military ability to have been a real threat to conquer Europe and marginalize US power. The second reason is that the world also was clearly divided into two camps- Germany's small group of fascist allies and the rest of the world arrayed against them. The Apache campaigns make a more compatible example because both they and the Islamists display: tactical prowess; strategic blindness; a lack of understanding of the opponent's society; divided western thought on the correct path to pursue; potentially supportive local populations split internally and externally about the proper course of action; vulnerability to ethnically related combatants and no industrial base.

The first step to fighting a fantasy ideology is to understand the nature of the enemy and how they view your society. In the Apache campaigns General Crook clearly understood the nature of both the enemy and of the United States. Crook knew that the Apache culture prized their control of the land and importance of warfare to the culture. He believed them when they said that they would fight for their freedom to raid until death. Because of his clear understanding of the Apache vision of a white free territory he could develop and execute a campaign that was designed to kill those who would not change their ideology and convince the survivors on the wisdom of change.

Crook fully identified with the American ideology of Manifest Destiny and the national goal of spreading American culture throughout the contiguous North American national territory. He keenly understood what the nation could do with the elements of national power and realized the American people were split on the proper course to follow to answer the "Indian Question."

Because of the clash between the Apache worldview and the American goals, the nation had a choice of three strategic courses of action. The first was for the United States to withdraw from the Southwest and to turn the land over to the Apache bands. This was impossible. The second was to annihilate every Apache. This was both impractical and morally repugnant. The third was the eventual acculturation of the Apaches combined with military power to safeguard settlers. This was the policy adopted.

Today the United States faces the same question and the same three basic strategic policies. Since the Islamists seek a worldwide "dar al-Islam", surrender of influence (territory) is still impossible. Annihilation is still not an option that agrees with the United States national vision of itself. That leaves assisting in raising the Muslim peoples social standards to a level that makes the Islamist goals unattractive while protecting American society from armed attacks.

Today, unlike for Crook, the theater of conflict is worldwide and the major emphasis for winning the conflict needs to be overseas. In contrast to Crook the current administration has

not grasped (or if they have, has not communicated) the nature of the fight the nation is in. President Bush and his advisors speak of the need to understand the nature of the threat and the need to appeal to Muslim interests.²² However, the administration has not consistently drawn US and worldwide attention to the Islamists stated goals and has not defined the United States war aims and determination to the Muslim world to gain their support.

The Apache bands and Islamists both require support from the local populations. The support can be material (arms and money), additional personnel, maneuver space or sanctuaries for rest and recuperation. Crook was masterful in isolating the breakout Apache bands from this support. In the current war the United States needs to do the same to the Islamists. Popular support for United States goals by the Muslims can be obtained by combining reliable and realistic support for local populations and governments; crushing military defeats of the Islamists; active Muslim/Western cooperation against the Islamist threat and the comprehensive use of the informational aspect of national power.

COMBAT COMPONENT OF THE CONFLICT

The step of establishing non-combatant trust in reliable support is important in separating the opponent from the larger population but it can not occur without a credible military threat. The American message to Muslim populations not directly involved as combatants of the value of not supporting the Islamist forces will not be accepted without a credible display of military victory. Crook realized this and he took two vital steps in establishing military credibility. He combined two steps- employment of ethically/religious related coalition forces and by unrelieved military pressure.

Crook recruited Apache Scouts from the non-renegade bands and, as bands surrendered, he expanded the Scouts by recruiting the recently surrendered warriors. By employing Apache scouts from the same or closely related bands he made the successful outcome of the conflict directly related to the material well-being of the families and bands. The Scouts knew that if they were not successful then not only they, but their families would suffer at the hands of their fellow Apaches. Crook armed the Scouts well with treasured modern arms and ammunition. Crook also preferred the wildest warriors he could obtain for he correctly believed that "I have not only found Indians used in this way invaluable service to the troops" and "that the treatment would go further to convince them of the benefits arising from their being our friends, than all the blankets and promises government could heap upon them."²³ Crook also realized that in order to obtain the maximum return from his Scouts that they needed to be led and used properly. To accomplish this he established an Apache chain of command closely supervised by specially

selected officers and civilian scouts. These tough and reliable men, like Lieutenant Charles Gatewood, were militarily proficient and culturally sensitive so they developed and maintained rapport with the Scouts. Crook also realized that the Scouts were the best force to find and fix a renegade band but increased manpower and firepower was vital in crushing the renegade band. Therefore he mixed a Scout force that worked 12–24 hours ahead of company sized teams of infantry or cavalry.

The second step that Crook instituted was a sharp and continuous campaign that was focused not on terrain but on the opposition bands. Crook's instruction to his command in 1871 made sure his intent was well known.

Indians should be induced to surrender in all cases where possible, where they preferred to fight, they were to get all the fighting they wanted, and in one good dose instead of a number of petty engagements, but in either case were to be hunted down until the last one in hostility had been killed or captured. Every effort should be made to avoid the killing of women and children. Prisoners of either sex should be guarded from ill-treatment of any kind. When prisoners could be induced to enlist as scouts, they should be enlisted, because the wilder the Apache was, the more likely wiles and stratagems of those still out in the mountains, their hiding places and intentions. No excuse was to be accepted for leaving a trail; if horses played out, the enemy must be followed on foot, and no sacrifice should be left untried to make the campaign short, sharp and decisive.²⁴

Crook also realized that the message would have an impact on the renegades so he made sure that Apache leaders knew the same message- that the army would not rest until the breakout bands were killed or surrendered. He combined these two elements in the 1871-1873 campaign. The campaign proceeded as Crook envisioned. The breakout bands repeatedly cited the effectiveness of the scout/soldier teams and the endless material support that they received. As Cha-lipun, one of the surviving prominent chiefs, said as he surrendered to a mixed Apache Scout and army force, "You see, we're are (*sic*) nearly dead from the want of food and exposure-the copper cartridge has done the business for us. I am glad for the opportunity to surrender, but I do it not because I love you, but because I am afraid of General."²⁵

Crook destroyed the Apache sanctuaries wherever they occurred. The sanctuaries within the United States were pursued by purely military means. He realized that the sanctuaries in Mexico must be destroyed as well but realized that a different strategy was required. In order to pursue this goal Crook combined the military with the diplomatic and made maximum use of the treaty that allowed "hot pursuit" of raiders and personal diplomacy with the military and

governors of the Mexican Border States. His efforts paid off, despite some rough spots and hot words, when the Mexican army vigorously pursued the Apache bands and worked with the US Army teams across the border. The Mexican army destroyed Victorio's band and Crook accepted Geronimo's surrender in the Mexican Sierra Madre.

Crook realized that peace would not be without incident and for a campaign to remain won he was willing to quickly resume military operations whenever they were required. Within months of their surrender, four recalcitrant leaders broke out and started raiding with part of their bands. Crook put out the word on the reservations and to the army that he would accept the surrender of the renegade bands only when the heads of the four leaders were brought in. Within three months all the heads were delivered (Crook ended up paying a bounty for Delshay's head twice to prevent dispute with two groups who brought in independent evidence).²⁶ While Crook's order raised a furor among the eastern seaboard pro-Indian groups he understood the psychological impact on the renegades, the remaining bands, and his scouts. The Apache warrior culture valued the mutilation of a corpse as an honor for the winning warrior and viewed compassion for the losers as a weakness offered only by those who were weak. Crook's understanding of Apache psychology and how to use it to his advantage helped to cement the message that to oppose the Army would lead not only to death but a damaged afterlife as well. By August 1873 the Apaches were broken as a power and most would never again fight the United States.

When Crook was recalled to Arizona in 1882 to crush the final Apache breakouts he used the same winning strategy. He reenergized the scout/infantry teams and made sure that the remaining Apache leaders knew the deadly consequences of fighting the United States. An example of this would be Crook's conference with the Apache leaders on October 15, 1882. He told the leaders that

While every encouragement and assistance would be given to Indians willing to be peaceful and to work, no mercy should be shown those who attempted to go on the warpath. If any Indians at the council felt disposed to break out, he thought it best for them to break out now and bring the question of supremacy to a test without more delay.²⁷

These were powerful words from the man that they all had unsuccessfully resisted within the last 10 years. The Apache leaders remembered how Crook had successfully destroyed their power and had no doubts he would do so again. At the same time the Apaches knew that his word on helping the peaceful bands was sound and could be trusted. They had also seen

how their quality of treatment had improved whenever Crook commanded the Department and supervised the Reservations. Because of this knowledge the breakout bands were not widely supported and most Apache warriors who desired a final fight fought wearing the red head of an Apache Scout. As Crook's adjutant, Lieutenant Azor H Nickerson, remarked, "The campaigns in Arizona did not owe their ultimate success to any particular Waterloo-like victory, as much as they did to the covering of a great deal of ground by a comparatively small number of men, permitting the Indians no rest, and rendering every hiding place insecure."²⁸

The United States is facing a military challenge that Crook would have recognized though the tools are new and it ranges not across the Southwestern US but across broad swaths of the globe. At the tactical level the United States has a military force designed and trained to conduct operations with native forces. The Special Forces are performing this difficult job across the globe to the highest standards and have employed Crook's lessons. Operationally the United States has not disrupted Al Qaeda's sanctuaries but has been employing joint SOF and conventional forces along with a scattering of coalition forces throughout the relevant Geographic Commands in order to create pressure on Islamist support. With the Bush Administration's current fixation on Iraq the Administration has allowed a strategic pause for Al Qaeda to reorganize and to re-seize the initiative.

Even before the United States initiated military operations the nation initiated a repeat of Crook's separation of renegade leaders. During his September 13, 2001 address, George W. Bush told the US Congress and the world that the Taliban leadership of Afghanistan must:

Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share their fate.²⁹

By September 21, 2001 the Afghan mullahs were concerned enough to invite bin Laden to "leave Afghanistan voluntarily."³⁰ These Afghan leaders were more concerned with their country than with supporting the Arab bin Laden. They urged the country's virtual dictator, Mullah Mohammed Omar, "This religious council, recommends to the political leadership of Afghanistan that encourages Osama bin Laden to leave Afghanistan voluntarily in good time for another destination."³¹ However, Mullah Omar was not convinced even when the sole country that recognized his government (Pakistan) withdrew recognition. Omar, like Delshay earlier, did not believe the resolve of the leader and country opposing him. Displaying that resolve, General Franks moved to Crook's next step and used overwhelming military power against the

renegades weakness combined with the use of native surrogate forces. The tools selected were the CIA and America's proud soldiers who wear the Apache Scouts old insignia and display Lieutenant Gatewood's leadership skills. Members of the 5th Special Forces linked up with bands of the Northern Alliance and brought with them training, supplies and the new copper cartridge- precision guided munitions and the smashing power of America's airpower. These combined US/Afghan teams harnessed airpower's power to the local knowledge of the Northern Alliance and its political goals. Franks also attacked the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their power centers thereby showing them their sanctuaries had disappeared. Franks knew that air attacks, no matter how devastating, would not have psychological impact on the Taliban like a ground attack and on October 19, 2001 a Ranger/Delta raiding force conducted an airborne assault on the Taliban's most important power base in the Kandahar area. The raid's goals were to destroy a Taliban barracks at Qila Jadeed and, most importantly, a command center belonging to Mullah Omar. The raid was successful, though Mullah Omar was reportedly 100 kilometers away.³²

Soon afterward the Kandahar raid, the Northern Alliance / 5th SFG attacks increased the pace of peeling apart the opposition forces from each other. Taliban forces started splitting from Al Qaeda forces. The Special Forces (SF) commanders followed Crook's guidance in enlisting these new forces and adding them to the coalition. Most of the former Taliban forces joined the Northern Alliance in attacking the remaining Taliban. This combination of local forces, American assistance and massive airpower proved decisive. Sixty-one days after the attacks on the Eastern United States (November 12, 2001) the Northern Alliance offensive liberated Mazar-I-Shariff and opened the ground routes for humanitarian aid to enter the country.³³ Kabul was liberated more quickly than the world believed possible. Throughout the liberated areas Afghans repeated the Apache customs by quickly killing many of the remaining Al Qaeda members.³⁴ As the number of the liberated areas increased the SF/Northern Alliance forces attacked over even more axis of advance. The end to the Taliban government was near. On 16 November Mullah Omar fled his Kandahar stronghold on a motorcycle not to be seen again.³⁵ The Taliban forces joined the Northern Alliance in increasing numbers and on December 22, 2001 when Karzai was sworn in as the interim President the last major Taliban leader surrendered his 12,000 men and weapons.³⁶

While the end of Taliban rule was being resolved, the United States and the British added conventional ground forces to the operations against the increasingly isolated Al Qaeda forces. Between 6 and 16 December mixed Northern Alliance and US Army forces fought the important battle in Tora Bora. This battle was the last attempt by large numbers of Al Qaeda to fight toe to

toe with the US military. While the battle was a success, the success was tempered by the December 16, 2001 escape of bin Laden over the adjacent Pakistani border along with estimated 1000 followers.³⁷ The escape was aided in part by an unexpected weakness in Northern Alliance support. Despite the best efforts of the SF teams, the Northern Alliance would not press the attack against outsiders as they did against the Afghan Taliban. This failure demonstrated a shortcoming in the value of surrogate forces. When different forces goals diverge, the surrogate force often have less value than national forces.

After a breathtakingly fast start, United States has allowed an operational and strategic pause in the operations. The nation has forgotten Crook's lessons on denying sanctuary and making peace more profitable than war. In Afghanistan, Islamist cells still operate and make intermittent attacks on military and civilian targets because the United States has not followed a strategy to pursue strong stability operations. There are few areas of Afghanistan where the local populations are separated and safe from Al Qaeda cells.

Because of Afghanistan's size and culture the United States can not create reservations like Crook, but it can follow the classic counter-insurgency strategy of "Ink Blot" operations. This strategy requires that US/Afghan forces create small areas where the population is safe from military reprisal, has access to law enforcement, active economic development and ongoing quality of life programs. From these areas, using mixed US and Afghan forces, operations are focused on increasing the size and numbers of safe areas thereby depriving their use by Al Qaeda.

The United States also has allowed a true sanctuary for the Al Qaeda to exist across the Afghan border in Pakistan. This sanctuary is vital to the Al Qaeda for supplies, propaganda purposes and is an area that will continually threaten the safety of both Afghanistan and the United States personnel. The solution to this problem, like in Crook's day, is a mixture of military operations and diplomatic efforts aimed at obtaining Pakistan's assistance (maximum) or their willingness to look the other way (minimum) as the United States pursues the use of combined local paramilitary/US operations.

Until the United States eliminates both Al Qaeda's internal and external sanctuaries, there is no hope to complete military operations in Afghanistan or to establish a secure Afghan state. If the US fails in this task, there is little chance of a long term success in the conflict with the Islamists.

The United States has used the same Special Forces/surrogate mixture elsewhere in the current conflict. SF has been active in the Philippines working with the local forces in the fight against the Al Qaeda affiliated Islamist group, Abu Sayaf. Philippine forces with SF advisors

have increased the pace and effectiveness of their operations in October 2001 and have kept up the operations since that time. There may be other SF teams working in Yemen, but elsewhere SOF forces are vital in isolating Islamists by working with local forces in areas that are not currently active theaters of conflict. The Combatant Commanders have ongoing SOF missions working with locals all over the world. The Commanders are continuing Crook's military mission of isolating renegade bands from the larger population.

It would be a mistake at this level to rely only on the few Special Forces and Special Operations Forces troops available. The United States, and its allies, should continue combined training with conventional task forces throughout the Muslim world. These exercises, combined with a planned informational and economic campaigns, will build wider trust of US goals and commitment to continued economic growth and military ability.

At the strategic level the United States needs to continue the military isolation of the Islamists. The best strategic option the US has is to emphasize the use of the other three elements of national power and use military force as a backup weapon. The only practical solution for Al Qaeda like groups is to quickly locate and kill their adherents and destroy the groups completely. It would be major mistake for the United States to allow these groups to appear repeatedly like a noxious weed. There are two wider groups that must be positively influenced to win the conflict. The first group is the approximately 10-15 percent of the world's Muslims who are militants and supportive of bin Laden's goals but not part of his movement.³⁸ America's military power will be rarely directed at this group. When the United States directs military power at them it should do so with precision and with the maximum psychological impact in order to reinforce the danger of fighting America. The second group consists of Muslims who do not accept the Islamist agenda but who concur with the Islamist anti-American viewpoint. This group's political spectrum spans from the far left to far right and may number half of all Muslims (~500 million persons).³⁹ With this group the United States will always need to consider a wide range of options on how to secure its national goals by proactively addressing the social pressures that lead to wide support for the Islamist goals.

NON-COMBATANT MUSLIM POPULATIONS COMPONENT

The military component of Crook's campaigns was only one factor in the equation of victory. Equally important were the actions that Crook took to ensure that the Apaches that remained on the reservations did not support the renegade bands. Crook broke support of the renegades by improving the standard of living for all and engendering a sense of trust with the Apache bands. When he arrived in 1871 Crook took immediate steps to establish his credibility.

While he was preparing for his 1871 offensive Crook published General Orders No. 43 on October 5, 1871 which established military standards of conduct. It directed (in part):

Officers and soldiers serving in this department are reminded that one of the fundamental principles of the military character is justice to all-Indians as well as white men- and that disregard of this principle is likely to bring about hostilities, and cause the death of the very persons they are sent here to protect. In all their dealing with the Indians, officers must be careful not only to observe the strictest fidelity, but to make no promises not in their power to carry out; all grievances arising within their jurisdiction should be addressed, so that an accumulation of them may not cause an outbreak.⁴⁰

Crook also realized the influential power of non-governmental groups on the long term situation. He knew that non-military corruption was negatively impacting the Indian tribes and hence the security of the region. Because of this, he took what steps were possible to clamp down on the agent and contractor corruption that flourished on the Reservations. He wrote the US District Attorney encouraging more vigorous action pursuing those who cheated or preyed upon Apaches. Crook wrote that the only way to prevent breakouts was to prosecute “the villains who fatten on the supplies intended for use of Indians willing to lead peaceful and orderly lives.”⁴¹

Crook was steadfastly opposed to separating the humanitarian and nation building component from the control and supervision of the military. He believed that the goals of the civilians (today's International Organizations and NGOs) were not in line with the long term goals of either the Apaches or United States. He also believed that the Bureau of Indian Affairs officials largely did not possess either the respect from the Apaches or the organizational abilities to lead a tough nation building effort. When Crook took control he initiated key actions in separating logistical support to the breakout bands. In 1871 he instituted a series of headcounts in order to monitor movement and to give the non-breakout populations a sense of being supervised. The Apache bands needed a way to support themselves so Crook undertook a two phase action to remedy this problem. In the short term he ensured to the maximum extent possible that the required delivered foodstuffs were delivered on time and of the appropriate quality and quantity. This combined with the accurate headcounts ensured the non-breakout Indians were fed, reducing their chance for flight as well as minimizing the surplus food available for distribution to the breakout bands. For the long term, Crook started ranching and farming programs. Crook made sure that appropriate tools and expertise were made available and the Apaches began to achieve success as farmers. They started selling to the local

communities and this was a key step in acculturation as Crook explained in a letter to the Indian Rights Association, "No sermon that ever was preached on the 'Dignity of Labor' could print upon the savage mind the impression received when he sees that *work* means *money*, and that the exact measure of his industry is to be found in his pocket book."⁴² In 1884 Crook reported that the two most impressive farming gains were made by Chato and Geronimo "...who last year were our worst enemies..."⁴³

Crook also worked with the building a society for the Apaches that one day could lead to acculturation. He reenergized Apache police and made sure that they could enforce the law. Crook then made sure that they knew that he would hold them responsible for attacks and breakouts that they could have prevented. Crook supported those organizations, both governmental and NGO, that would operate schools for the youth. He also stopped the Apache practice of cutting the noses off of wives who got caught, or suspected, of adultery thereby gaining additional support from the Apache women.

These actions combined with the energetic and effective campaigning made the idea of reservation life more acceptable to the breakout bands. When Crook accepted the surrender of a band and they returned to a reservation he did not carry over old grudges. Crook ensured that his subordinates incorporated the newly arrived bands into reservation life and started recruiting the warriors for the Apache Scouts.

Crook also knew that the Apache people where sensitive to, and critical of, white hypocrisy. As the bands arrived Crook's orders ensured equal standards of justice for both the red and white populations. "While [the Indians] should not be judged harshly for acts which in civil codes would constitute minor offense, care should also be taken that they do not succeed in deceiving their agents and the officers, in matters of great import, being careful to treat them as children in *ignorance* not in *innocence*."⁴⁴

This practice of a velvet glove covering an iron fist paid dividends. Whenever Crook and the army supervised the reservations, breakouts were almost nonexistent and the Apaches slowly acculturated themselves to the whites' ways. The ultimate payoff occurred during the breakout period of 1880s. The 1870s campaigns were against large bands of Apaches but the 1880s campaigns were against small and marginalized bands of renegades. One example of success was seen in the 1883 breakout. During that breakout the bands on the San Carlos and White Mountain reservations heard that the renegades were reported on their way for supplies, arms and recruits. The bands self mobilized so the renegades received no support. As Britton Davis reported in his account on the Geronimo wars, "Guns and ammunition we had never suspected the Indians of having were produced, and a number of armed Tonto and San Carlos

Apaches voluntarily took up the task of outposts in the neighboring hills.⁴⁵ The renegade band's scouts reported what was happening on the reservation and the band turned away from the potential base of supplies toward New Mexico.

Today the United States does not look at a corner of the Southwestern US but at denying popular support to the Islamists throughout an entire region of the world. The scale of the challenge has changed but not the principles. The United States will disrupt any country that it fights in or near. In Afghanistan, CENTCOM and the UN are working to establish support for the administration of Hamid Karzai. Like Crook, the focus is establishing alternatives to Islamist support while working with both US military and other organizations. The first key steps in this effort were the humanitarian efforts that started even before September 11, 2001. The United States was the single largest humanitarian aid donor prior to the attacks and had a knowledge of the needs and culturally appropriate foods required in Afghanistan. American humanitarian aid efforts started on the first night of the bombing of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Prior to the opening of the land aid routes 2.2 million humanitarian food packets were air dropped. Simultaneously UN, NGO and US food dumps were built up in nearby Uzbekistan. When the SF/Northern Alliance forces seized the city of Mazar-i-Shariff the way was open for a flood of aid to be trucked into the country. Prior to this, many nay sayers were predicting millions of starvation deaths but the scale of US lead efforts totally confounded the earlier fears. General Franks saw that this was an important first step in order to separate the population from the Islamists. The second and more difficult effort is underway with the UN and US efforts to build a more modern society that support the needs of the Afghan people.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu (Turkey), stated during an interview on "The News Hour with Jim Lehrer" (November 21, 2002) that the current efforts concentrate on: developing infrastructure, mine reduction and law enforcement. General Zorlu stated that the key to long term peace is the establishment of the central government because "as government get stronger the people are safer."⁴⁶ The humanitarian aid efforts are concentrating on public health and utilities projects and that while funding is still a problem (less US, EU and Turkish funding) there has been "one hundred percent implementation of what has been promised to date."⁴⁷ General Zorlu stated that the "public support for Al Qaeda is dropping" and that he expects this trend to continue.⁴⁸

The danger for the United States in Afghanistan is if the United States curtails its belated participation in the nation building campaign. United States operations in Afghanistan were focused on combat vice stability operations until October 2002. From the first night of the aerial campaign, US forces were active in local Civil-Military Operations and humanitarian relief.

However, the administration had decided to pursue no larger campaign of nation building. President Bush stuck to this position and even as the fall of Kabul became inevitable he was still telling the National Security Council,

Look, I oppose using the military for nation building. Once the job is done, our forces are not peacekeepers. We ought to put in place a U.N. protection and leave, but if fighting resumes and the Taliban come back from the hills, who has to stabilize the situation?⁴⁹

Belatedly, the administration realized that the United States was going to have to provide security and guidance to nation building. With that acknowledgement the United States backed into nation building effort.

Now that United States nation building efforts have started it must continue and expand in order to separate the Islamists from local populations and deny them popular support. It is vital that the Afghan population continues to see the improvements in their lives being the result of their efforts combined with the strong support of the United States. The proven strategy for accomplishing this is the “ink blot” method. The key for success is not purely military, success comes from a robust interagency process. Fortunately the United States and the Afghan government do not have to undertake this process alone. The International Security and assistance Force (ISAF) can contribute to success. The initial ISAF efforts were lead by nations that either were strong partners (Great Britain) or steadfast allies with a great deal to lose to Islamist gains (Turkey). The ISAF leadership is due to transition to Germany and The Netherlands; countries that will expand the efforts of nation building but without the United States’ economic and informational capabilities.

If the United States surrenders in its efforts, it will have forgotten Crook’s lessons: your word is your bond; and to make peace more profitable than war. The Bush administration publicly pledged to support the Afghan people. As Secretary of State Powell stated, “we don’t want to leave any contamination behind. That is in the interests of the Afghan people and certainly the mission we came here to perform.”⁵⁰ The Afghan people, and the rest of the Muslim world, is watching to see if the US will follow up its powerful military power with the other elements of national power arrayed on lifting people out of the Islamist threat.

The strategic importance of securing Afghanistan from the Islamist orbit cannot be underestimated. A secure Afghanistan, with the Islamist groups destroyed both internally and externally is vital in securing Muslim support for United States campaign against terror. But Afghanistan does not exist in a vacuum and to assist in separating Muslim support from

Islamism requires the US to be seen aiding Muslim societies in their attempts to build more efficient economic and social systems. United States economic, diplomatic and informational power must be focused on those societies not involved in the current fight. Crook realized this and made sure the acculturation efforts that he poured into the Apache reservations were duplicated with the other tribes in the region. By keeping the Mohave, Navajo and other “warlike” tribes at peace he secured his rear and brought about peace throughout the region.

INFORMATIONAL COMPONENT OF THE CONFLICT

During the Apache campaigns Crook used all the elements of information that were available. He spoke to the press, allowed them to accompany the Army in the field, wrote for national publications, kept communication clear with his superiors and corresponded with influential civilian groups. Within his department he not only communicated with the whites, he kept communications clear with the Apaches and both the Reservation Bands and renegades knew that his word, whether it was about aid or destruction, was good. When the military or acculturation campaigns were apparently achieving success the information campaign went well. When there were rough spots in the campaigns the information campaign suffered, but Crook (and at the end Miles) persevered until the final peace was won.

Crook’s successful information campaign gave him wide latitude with his superiors, local whites and the nation to prosecute the Apache campaigns. Three New York Times editorials from the 1882-3 campaign illustrate the trust he had earned. On August 12, 1882 the Times supported Crook’s calls for proper treatment of the Apaches and the dangers of white corruption.

A dispatch from Tucson, Arizona, says that the Indian chief Eskiminzin is making preparations for war, and that the settlers of the region (the San Pedro country) are greatly alarmed. The same dispatch describes Eskiminzin as “one of the most treacherous and vindictive Indians in the Territory.” This is merely a lying trick for ulterior purposes.⁵¹

Later in 1883, as Crook was bringing in Geronimo’s bands, many in the nation were calling for hanging most of the renegades. But Crook’s adroit use of information operations made his vision the baseline. A New York Times editorial titled ‘Gen. Crook’s Victory’ stated

There will be a popular demand for their instant execution. The disposition of this knotty question [the treatment of the renegade bands] may be safely left to the Secretary of War, who has from the first reposed absolute confidence in Gen.

Crook's ability, as well as in his wisdom in managing the difficulties arising from the Indian troubles of the border.⁵²

The Times wrote again four days later, "High as popular passion may rise in Arizona, nobody will lynch the Apache captives. There are too many of them. Besides there is Crook." And after examining the status of the Apaches as "wards of the Nation", "foreign enemies", "thieves and murderers" who were "kidnapped in Mexico" the article concludes

No disposition of the captive Apaches could be made consistent with all the courses which the Government has heretofore pursued. The situation is a novel one. People generally would be satisfied to accept any solution that may be offered by Gen. Crook.⁵³

With this mandate- echoed by President Hayes- Crook continued with his acculturation campaign and the 1886 breakout by Geronimo was not supported on the reservations.

The greatest weakness in the current conflict is the United States' information campaign. The United States has totally forgotten Crook's lessons. The administration currently enjoys broad domestic support and wide non-Muslim world support for the conflict. From the earliest days the administration has focused on domestic support. As Donald Rumsfeld said in a NSC Principals Meeting in September 2001, "Need tighter control over public affairs. Treat it like a political campaign with daily talking points. Sustaining requires a broad base of domestic support."⁵⁴ However, the conflict's center of gravity is obtaining Muslim support and it is there that the United States is losing the fight. This is especially disheartening because no nation on earth advertises commercial products as well as the United States.

The administration has not developed a consistent message of the conflict's goals and means for the Muslim world. Too often multiple opposing messages reach the Muslim world. Shortly before the liberation of Kabul, Secretary of State Powell was outlining in the press a combined US/UN/Afghan post Taliban nation building effort and the Secretary of Defense was publicly saying,

I don't think [it] leaves us with a responsibility to try to figure out what kind of government that country ought to have. I don't know people who are smart enough from other countries to tell other countries the kind of arrangements they ought to have to govern themselves.⁵⁵

The administration has not decided on a theme beyond “destroy terrorism”. A weakness with this message in the Muslim world is that current Israeli tactics are seen by most Muslims as terrorism, and they see the United States as backing Israel. They perceive hypocrisy in the US position like the Apaches did in Arizona. The primary weakness with the current US terrorism message is that it gives the Muslim world no reason to support the fight. There is no message of hope, of economic improvement and social security, to dissuade Muslims from the siren song of the Islamist message. Muslims may be skeptical of the Islamist vision, but currently it is the only vision presented that addresses their needs.

The information problem is not limited to deciding on a message. Once the message is decided upon it must be disseminated widely and continuously to the Muslim world. Al-Jazeera, the Arab cable news network, is flowing out the Islamist message, yet the administration does not seek to use Al-Jazeera to get out the United States’ message with frequent interviews with key members of the administration. Even when the United States does take a positive step, such as President Bush’s Afghan Children’s Fund, the administration has let the message fade from the world and Muslim stages. The ACF was a campaign for American children to donate a \$1 each to help Afghan children. This was a terrific idea that could personalize the war in a positive way for American children and be a great psychological counter to the Islamist message of “America hates Islam”. After the initial news announcements the administration let the effort leave the news cycle permanently. Because of this silence any good deed will not be credited, and a smart propagandist could use the silence to build a campaign on how the United States word is not reliable.

The administration has also muddled the conflict’s message by the new focus on Iraq. The Muslim world sees Saddam Hussein not as an Islamist, but as a leader of secularist Muslim state.⁵⁶ The Muslim world views the potential war not as against those who attacked the US, but as grab of control of “Arab oil.”⁵⁷ By changing the emphasis of the message the United States lost the message. In the Muslim world the two current conflicts are Israel/PLO and Iraq. When the United States moves against the Islamist movement it will not be seen as a continuation of anti-Islamist campaign, but as a new conflict not related to September 11, 2001.

Because the United States has not developed and implemented an information operations campaign, operations from the tactical to the strategic level are suffering. Tactically in Afghanistan the PSYOP process is too slow and stove piped to take advantage of quickly exploiting Civil-Military Operations, combat or law enforcement successes and therefore there is no wider impact of the nation building efforts beyond the immediate village or neighborhood where the operation occurred.

Most Afghans and Muslims have never heard of the US/Afghan efforts after the “wedding party bombing”. The efforts are a success story that has remained unheard. Immediately after the bombing the United States sent in Civil Affairs teams to ensure the village would not become pro-Islamist. Through hard work and cultural sensitivity the village is now solidly pro-Karzai. In Afghanistan the information operations elements have not made sure that this story is widely known. Strategically, the administration has not worked with international and Muslim media to make sure that this message gets out. The entire Muslim world heard of the bombing but the United States has let the world be deaf to the current successful state of the village. The Islamists use regional and worldwide media very effectively to get their message out. The United States has almost entirely ignored the use of the same regional television and radio stations to regularly get its message out.

THE WAY AHEAD

President Bush is correct when he says the current conflict will take years and will not be fought as a conventional war. The United States has employed the military component well in combat operations. However, it is important that the military be robustly employed as part of the Interagency Task Force in order to provide the required military strength, information operations support and logistical might for successful nation building. Nation building in this conflict is key to “Secure the Victory” as the Civil Affairs Branch motto states.

The successful application of United States economic and informational power will starve the Islamists from the support in the Muslim world. The administration is correct to seek a coalition of willing nations and the support of the United Nations and NGOs. Other nations have a stake in the successful outcome of this conflict and their participation will help defray American costs and cement support. In addition there will be times that the United States will want others to wear the mask of public leadership. To have a wide range of allies will allow the US to use this option.

The United States is losing the information war. The nation must place emphasis on this element of national power. It is not enough to out fight or outspend the enemy. The US must win the war of public perception. Because the center of gravity in this aspect of the conflict is overseas the United States needs to focus its message there. Like Crook, the United States needs to use information to minimize the number of enemy combatants and to stop them from receiving noncombatant support. The United States should make sure the enemy, the larger Muslim public and the western public understand the increased standard of living by not fighting outweighs the brief glory of fighting a hopeless battle.

There are three important steps to achieve this end. The first is to embrace that the center of gravity for information is the Muslim world and not domestically. The domestic information front is the supporting front. The second step is to recreate the Office of War Information with much of the same charter it possessed in World War II. The director will be the “go to” person for focusing the interagency information process and the spreading the administration’s message. The third step is to speed up the information operations process. Currently the process is too stove piped and centrally run to enable those who are running information operations to react in time to meet the current news and information cycles. Slow and non-repetitive information operations are failed information operations.

CONCLUSION

The United States is fighting a campaign similar in many respects to that which faced George Crook in the late 19th century. Technology has changed, but as the US embraces the new technologies it must remember to learn from those who fought before. While the scale and theater has changed, the applicability of Crook’s lessons of: unrelenting military pressure to destroy the enemy in the field and their sanctuaries; combined indigenous/US military teams to improve efficiency and destroy enemy morale; make peace more profitable than warfare; and use information to isolate the enemy from natural support and gain indigenous compliance and support- remain just as correct and useful as when he practiced them in 1871-1886. Crook validated these lessons in the crucible of unconventional war. The United States just needs to remember and apply them with patience and resolve.

WORD COUNT=10,933

ENDNOTES

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²³ Charles M. Robinson III, General Crook and the Western Frontier (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 111.

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²⁶ Ibid., 139.

²⁷ Thrapp, 261.

²⁸ Robinson, 140.

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³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

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³³ Ibid., 327.

³⁴ Ibid.

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³⁶ Ibid., 330.

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³⁸ Pipes, 247.

³⁹ Ibid., 248.

⁴⁰ Robinson, 255-256.

⁴¹ Ibid., 257.

⁴² Ibid., 270.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Robinson, 139.

⁴⁵ Thrapp, 270.

⁴⁶ Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu, interview on "The News Hour with Jim Lehrer" 21 November 2002.

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⁵² Ibid., 158.

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⁵⁵ Woodward, 220.

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